Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the people who perform the attack scenarios presented in this article are advanced attackers who are familiar with the specific facilities being targeted, including industrial robots. As a result, external attackers inevitably go through many other IT and OT assets before they actually reach an industrial robot, and it takes a considerable amount of time and effort to complete such attacks, and obviously, the clear intention to attack. Industrial robots are usually not directly connected to the Internet, instead they are located on a field network in a factory environment. The reason for this is the placement characteristics of the industrial robots that are the target of attacks over a network. The attack scenarios presented in this article are assumed to be feasible by highly skilled and budgeted cyber attackers targeting well-defined targets. By combining these, self-spreading malware written in a programming language for industrial robots is generated and executed.Ĭyber attackers with advanced technology are assumed
CODE FOR MAC ADDRESS FILTERING VERIFICATION
In addition, defective input value verification in task programs is exploited to cause industrial robots to execute functions corresponding to invalid external input.
CODE FOR MAC ADDRESS FILTERING CODE
Information theft via robots: Confidential information is stolen by launching a path traversal attack that exploits a vulnerability in a task program.Changing of robot operation via the network: By exploiting defective input value verification of the motion server and transmitting invalid coordinate value data via the network, robots are made to perform unintended operations.We have demonstrated three attack scenarios that exploit these vulnerabilities. Trend Micro verified around 100 task programs available from public code repositories (GitHub and online communities), and we could confirm the presence of vulnerabilities such as "defective input value verification," "lack of authentication functions," and "remote code execution" in most of the code. In this second installment, based on the results of our proof of concept, we explain in detail three attack scenarios that can directly lead to damage through theft of money and theft of information. What happens when the field of security requirements that have not been deeply discussed for a long time are incorporated into the trend toward smarter systems? In this series, based on the results of our third joint research project with the Polytechnic University of Milan, from a short to long-term perspective, we analyze the design security risks involved in legacy languages and risk mitigation measures that all users of industrial robots should take. Trend Micro has been conducting cybersecurity research on smart factories since 2017, and discovered vulnerabilities in "task programs" that define the behavior of industrial robots and also design flaws in "programming languages." Despite being legacy languages that were designed decades ago, these languages are still used in modern smart factories because they are difficult to replace with other languages. However, it is not commonly known that industrial robots are programmed using languages designed decades ago.
In addition, as equipment that realizes unmanned manufacturing in the post-COVID-19 world where minimal or no contact is a necessity, the importance of industrial robots that can repeatedly execute specified movements with high accuracy is regaining attention. Industrial robots are the core of the automation of manufacturing processes in smart factories, and are the most important components as they support the manufacture of all kinds of products such as automobiles, aircraft, processed foods, and pharmaceuticals.
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